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COMMENTS
THE LIABILITY OF "OUTSIDE" DIRECTORS AS AIDERS
AND ABETTORS UNDER RULE 106-5
by Dana G. Kirk
In recent years there has been explosive growth of securities fraud litiga-
tion under rule lOb-5. 1 With this growth has come an extension of liability
to those who are not primary wrongdoers, but whose activities are merely
collaterally related to the primary wrong. 2 The liability of each defendant
under rule 1Ob-5 varies with the degree of participation and knowledge of
the fraudulent transaction which is attributable to him.3 However, the li-
ability imposed by rule lob-5 generally applies only to transactions which
involve acts reasonably associated with the purchase or sale of securities, 4
and does not dictate the standards of a director's responsibility in the ordi-
nary management of corporate affairs apart from securities transactions.5
Privity of contract has been virtually eliminated as a condition of recovery
under rule 10b-5, 6 and consequently many persons who are not direct parties
to the fraudulent transaction but who are adversely affected by it may re-
cover.7 The possibility of multiple plaintiffs has substantially increased the
potential damages8 which might be awarded, and because a defendant who
is merely secondarily liable may be required to share the burden equally
with those who are primarily liable,9 the possible liability of the secondary
participant is great.
This Comment focuses upon the potential secondary liability of "outside"
directors i(those who do not participate in the day-to-day management of
the corporation) for the fraudulent acts of others associated with the man-
agement of the enterprise. Part I is an examination of the historical per-
spective of the director's responsibility at common law for fraudulent mis-
representations, and a review of the manner and methods by which rule
1. SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
2. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abet-
ting, Conspiracy, in Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L.
REv. 597, 599 (1972).
3. Id.
4. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
5. State statutory and case law has generally controlled the corporate director's
responsibility with respect to the management of the corporation. In re Franchard
Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964). Conversely, the devel-
opments centering around the antifraud provisions in Securities Exchange Act § 10(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), have sig-
nificantly contributed to the development of a federal common law with respect to the
purchase and sale of securities. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 4, Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
6. 2 A. BROMBERG, Sacuiunus LAW: Fatru § 8.5(120), at 206 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as BROMBERG].
7. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been conducive to suits by multiple
plaintiffs, especially with regard to class actions and derivative suits. FED. R. CIv. P.
23, 23.1.
8. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
9. Ruder, supra note 2, at 647-51.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
lOb-5 has expanded this duty. In Part II an important distinction is drawn
between the requisite knowledge of a participant and that required of an
aider and abettor, as well as a distinction between the concepts of aiding
and abetting and conspiracy. This section also deals in some detail with
the elements of liability under rule 1Ob-5 for an aider and abettor. In Part
III the liability of an outside director as an aider and abettor under rule
lOb-5 is analyzed and Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,10 and SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd.," two cases of significance in this area, are examined with particularity.
Part IV contains a discussion of methods of reducing the outside director's
liability as an aider and abettor. Finally, Part V sets forth some conclusions
to be drawn from the discussion in general and highlights some policy con-
siderations.
I. DIRECTOR's DUTY AT COMMON LAW
A. Outside Director's Responsibility for a Fraudulent
Misrepresentation of Another at Common Law
The common law is relevant to the interpretation and application of rule
lOb-5 and section 10(b) 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 not only
because directors' duties have been determined by case law in the past but
also because the duties of directors are still governed by state case law as
well as federal law.13 At early common law there was no duty upon di-
rectors to insure that all adverse information concerning a sale or purchase
of corporate securities was conveyed to prospective purchasers.' 4 In Dovey
v. Cory,' 5 a leading English case, a non-participant director was exonerated
from responsibility for fraudulent misrepresentations made by other officers
and directors in the form of a balance sheet which misstated profits. Cory
was an outside director in that he did not participate in the management
or preparation of financial reports of the company. Although it was argued
that Cory should have been cognizant of the "network of conspiracy and
fraud by which he was surrounded,"' 6 there was no evidence that he had
any direct knowledge of the fraudulent scheme. Lord Halsbury rejected the
invitation to find liability for breach of a duty to investigate. Instead he
held that a director may properly rely on -the integrity and professional com-
petence of other officers and directors in the conduct of the business and
that he may properly rely upon financial statements prepared for the com-
pany.' 7
10. 479 F.2d 1277 (2dCir. 1973).
11. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970).
13. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1291 (2d Cir. 1973).
14. Id. at 1292. If the corporation itself were in privity with the plaintiff, it ap-
pears that even at common law it had a duty not to induce the plaintiff to enter a
transaction by 'affirmative misrepresentation. See BROMBERG § 8.5(110), at 205.
15. [19011 A.C. 477. See also Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972),
for a more recent American case which follows the same rationale as Dovey, in refus-
ing to hold a director responsible for misrepresentations in financial statements.
16. [1901] A.C. 477, 485.
17. Lord Halsbury said:
I cannot think that it can be expected of a director that he should be
watching either the inferior officers of the bank or verifying the calcu-
lations of the auditors himself. The business of life could not go on if
[Vol. 28
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Judge Learned Hand in the leading American case of Barnes v. An-
drews'8 refused to hold an outside director liable for fraudulent statements
in a circular distributed by the management. Hand employed the rationale
that the outside director might justifiably place confidence in 'those who pre-
pared the circular and that an outside director could not be charged with
the duty of detailed supervision of the business. 19 The outside director's
liability at common law for the fraudulent misrepresentations of others
would seem to turn on whether or not he had knowledge of the wrongful
act.20 However, it has been suggested that at common law an outside direc-
tor could be held liable on the basis of constructive knowledge of the fraudu-
lent misrepresentation, that is, careless or reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of a statement. 21
B. Standing To Sue-The Dissolution of Privity
At common law privity of contract was a requisite element in an action
to recover damages for fraud. 22  The plaintiff could sue only the person
from whom he bought or to whom he sold. 23 In the leading English case
of Peek v. Gurney,24 the directors of a corporation distributed a prospectus
which contained fraudulent misrepresentations in expectation of inducing in-
vestors to buy their stock. The court held that a plaintiff who purchased
stock in an open market transaction and not directly from the defendant
in the original offering could not recover for the damages which he suffered
in reliance upon the misrepresentation. The court limited standing to sue
to those whom the defendants had desired to influence in the primary of-
fering. 25 However, as the case law progressed, courts began to allow suit
against a defendant who had -fraudulently induced the plaintiff to buy from
another.26
Privity as a necessary element -to an action for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion has been eroded by the advent of modern communication devices which
people could not trust those who are put into a position of trust for the
express purpose of attending to details of management.
Id. at 486.
18. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
19. The opinion further indicated that merely a general awareness of business af-
fairs was not sufficient knowledge to result in liability of an outside director for spe-
cific fraudulent business transactions 'by the management. Id. at 616.
20. If, for whatever reason, the director took no part in the preparation,
ratification or issuance of the false statement or circular, he is not lia-
ble, it has been held, to purchasers who acted on the faith of the state-
ment. He has done nothing. And he is not to be held vicariously for
the fraud or negligence of others, co-directors, executives or underwriters,
unless he has constituted them his 'agents.'
Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 240 (1933).
21. Id. at 242.
22. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 702-03 (4th ed. 1971), for a general discus-
sion of how more remote plaintiffs could recover for misrepresentations upon which
they relied to their detriment.
23. BROMBERG, § 8.5(110), at 205.
24. L.R. 6 Eng. & Ir. App. 377 (1873).
25. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 702.
26. See, e.g., Willcox v. Harriman Sec. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1933);
Holloway v. Forsyth, 226 Mass. 358, 115 N.E. 483 (1917). See also Prosser, Misrep-
resentations and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231 (1966).
1974]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
provide a medium through which one misrepresentation may affect many
persons.2 7 Because of the complex economy of our modern society, one mis-
representation may overlap into several transactions and cause widespread
mischief. Likewise, the privity requirement has all but disappeared from
actions under rule lOb-5. 28  Generally, the courts have allowed plaintiffs in-
jured in open market transactions to sue various defendants with whom they
are not in privity for violation of the fraud provisions of rule lOb-5. 29  This
result is substantiated by the phraseology of rule l0b-530 which extends lia-
bility to "any person" who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation in violation
of the rule either "directly" or "indirectly" or "in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security."'1
Both the courts and the commentators seem to view the abandonment of
privity as an advantageous method to provide the flexibility which is neces-
sary to effectuate the remedial purposes of rule lOb-5.32
Without the protection against suit that -the "armor" of privity once pro-
vided, the outside director is a potentially vulnerable target for the imagina-
tive plaintiff. However, if he is not a participant in the wrongful act, it
is generally agreed that some degree of knowledge of the wrongful act will
be required in order for liability to be imposed upon him.33
H. SECONDARY LIABILITY UNDER RULE 1Ob-5
A. Theories of Liability
Although the dissolution of privity has dramatically expanded the class
of those who have standing to sue and to be sued under rule lOb-5, the
27. The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation demonstrates how misrepresentations can ad-
versely affect many investors in open market transactions. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
28. Privity is still required in actions for recission of the security -transaction. See,
3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1626-27 (1961).
29. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), where an out-
side director was sued by an individual adversely affected in a transaction in which
the director was not a party. See also Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (accountant for issuing company sued by open market buyer); Cochran v. Chan-
ning, 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (open market buyer sued controlling stock-
holder).
30. SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
31. Id. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952), Judge Learned Hand set out the much noted "Birnbaum Doc-
trine" which has been read to refuse causes of action under rule lOb-5 to all those who
are not purchasers or sellers of securities. Many courts have stretched the meaning
of "purchasers" or "sellers" to include a variety of persons not encompassed by the
clear meaning of the words. Rather than indulge this fiction to preserve the constric-
tive Birnbaum test, the Seventh Circuit in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), extended the standing to sue under rule lob-5 to the
limits which were originally set out by the "case or controversy" requisites of U.S.
CONST. art. III. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Thus, the protec-
tion of rule lob-5 now extends to investors who suffer significant injury as a direct
consequence of fraud in connection with a securities transaction, even though they did
not directly participate in the purchase or sale of the security.
32. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Carroll v. First
Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970). BRoM-
BERG § 8.5(512), at 208.1. See Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under
Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125.
33. BROMBERG § 8.5(582), at 208.42; Ruder, supra note 2, at 620; Ruder, Wheat
& Loss, Standards of Conduct Under the Federal Securities Acts, 27 Bus. LAw. 75
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Standards of Conduct].
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plaintiff must still establish either a direct violation or a significant connec-
tion with the violation by the defendant. Three important concepts have
been used by the courts to describe the degree of involvement and corres-
ponding liability of the actor under rule 10b-5: participation, aiding and
abetting, and conspiracy.3 4
Participation. Participation is a term used by the courts to describe the
most direct involvement in the violation.3 5  Generally the violator will be
a buyer or a seller in the transaction. However, persons who actively induce
a -transaction by misrepresentations or nondisclosures may also be considered
to be participants."
As a general premise, persons who actively participate in the transaction
will be held to a higher standard of care than those who only participate
in a collateral way.37 Similarly, experts or professionals 38 may be held to
a higher standard of care because investors may be expected to place greater
reliance in their statements.39  It has also been argued that persons in
higher echelons of management may be held by a stricter standard of care
with respect to misrepresentations than those in lower positions because the
higher ranking personnel have more control over the decision process and
investors place greater reliance in their statements. 40  This seems to place
the outside director in a precarious position, because he takes part in the
34. The courts have failed to draw any distinct boundaries between the classifica-
tion of defendants as participators, aiders and abettors, or conspirators primarily be-
cause the concepts seem to describe different degrees of involvement rather than sep-
arate kinds of involvement. Also, plaintiffs are unwilling to settle for only one theory
of recovery but instead allege that recovery should be granted on the basis of a com-
bination of these concepts. For instance, in Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353,
355 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970), the complaint was phrased
in terms of participation and conspiracy. Due to the fact that many complaints may
allege more than one of these degrees of involvement, the courts might deal with par-
ticipation, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy allegations simultaneously, which some-
times has produced language that is indistinct. In Carroll, although the complaint was
phrased in terms of participation or conspiracy, the court stated that the defendant was
alleged to be an aider and abettor. Id. at 357. See also SEC v. National Bankers
Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 197 (N.D. Tex.), alf'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
35. For an excellent discussion of the different degrees of involvement of defend-
ants under rule 10b-5, see BROMBERG § 8.5(515), at 208.4-.6.
36. See, e.g., Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
37. Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution o1 a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the
Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206, 1210 (1970).
BROMBERG § 8.5(582), at 208.43.
38. The leading case concerning professional persons' independent duty to the pub-
lic is Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), which indicated that an ac-
countant could be liable to an open market trader for failing to disclose after-acquired
financial information. Accord, Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D.
111. 1967).
39. Although the courts have generally required some degree of knowing misrepre-
sentation on the part of the professional person or expert, H.L. Green Co. v. Childree,
185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931), it is arguable that recovery should be allowed for negligent misrepre-
sentations by those which the professional person intended to influence. RESTATEMENT(SEcoND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 552, at 56 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
40. See Mann, supra note 37, at 1212-13. He argues persuasively that the court
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), held defendants to different standards of care depending




ultimate decision process, but frequently is not cognizant of lower manage-
ment functions that could lead to violations of rule lOb-5. Therefore, to
characterize the director as a participant in the scheme to defraud simply
because of his management level would seem unjust. Some degree of
knowledge should be required before liability in imposed on the outside di-
rector or other similarly situated defendants under rule l0b-5. 4 1
The circuits are split concerning the degree of knowledge which will be
required on the part of the participant to establish liability under rule 10b-
5.42 Some courts have indicated that the participant must exhibit scienter,
that is, some degree of actual knowledge of the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions. 43  Other courts have purported to apply a negligence standard, al-
though no court has yet decided a case in which liability was imposed upon
a participant under rule 10b-5 for negligence alone. 44  Some courts seem
to arrive at the proper standard of knowledge to be applied by focusing upon
the facts of the case rather than becoming preoccupied with whether the
proper degree of knowledge or negligence was proven. 45
It is necessary to distinguish between the director's participation in the
fraudulent mismanagement of the corporation and his participation in decep-
tive conduct associated with the sale or purchase of securities which would
give rise to liability under rule lOb-5. In O'Neill v. Maytag46 the court
refused a cause of action under rule 10b-5 by stockholders against members
of the board of directors of National Airlines who unanimously approved
41. It has been suggested that the greater the actor's involvement in the violative
transaction, the less knowledge will be required to establish liability. Fry v. Shu-
maker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
42. The Second Circuit has generally required some knowledge by the alleged par-
ticipant of the fraudulent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson Hammill
& Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971); Fischman v. Ratheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783(2d Cir. 1951). However, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), the court of appeals accepted a
constructive knowledge standard, i.e., defendants' lack of knowledge is the result of con-
duct which is so reckless or careless -that knowledge will be attributed to the defend-
ant. The Tenth Circuit has also required scienter. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
The Ninth Circuit in Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), has been said
to have rejected scienter as a requisite for suit under rule 10b-5. However, it has been
observed that in that case the facts were sufficient to establish actual knowledge, so
it could be argued that this circuit has not yet decided a case where liability was im-
posed under rule lOb-5 for merely negligent conduct. Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5,
67 Nw. L. REV. 562, 584 (1972). The Eighth Circuit seems to concur in principle
with the Ninth Circuit in eliminating the scienter requirement. Vanderboom v. Sexton,
422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
43. See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp.
42, 44 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973).
44. See Bucklo, supra note 42, at 570. But see BROMBERO § 8.4(585), at 204.214-
.217, for an in-depth discussion of several cases which sustained complaints based on
merely negligent conduct by the participant.
45. In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970), the court considered the defendant's economic moti-
vations along with other factors in determining liability. Some courts have been more
willing to hold a defendant who is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff to a
higher standard of care, see, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp.
757 (D. Colo. 1964), and, conversely, the expertise of the plaintiff in financial matters
has been held to lower the standard of conduct which is required of the defendant.
See, e.g., Sandor v. Ruffer, Ballan & Co., 309 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For a
general discussion see Mann, supra note 37, at 1210-19.
46. 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
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a stock re-exchange transaction which required that the corporation repur-
chase its own stock at an excessive price.47  The court held that the duty
allegedly breached was only the general duty existing among directors, of-
ficers, and stockholders, and thus no cause of action was stated under rule
lOb-5 because the directors did not participate in any deceptive conduct as-
sociated with the securities transaction. However, in Ruckle v. Roto Ameri-
can Corp.48 the court sustained a cause of action brought by a minority
director under rule lOb-5 against the majority of the board of directors who
allegedly failed to disclose to the remaining directors information pertinent
to a proposed stock issuance transaction by the corporation. 49
Implicit in this discussion of a higher standard of care for participants is
the tacit assumption that there is a lower standard of responsibility for those
who are only indirectly involved with the transaction. This secondary liabil-
ity of outside directors and other defendants similarly circumstanced is the
next subject of inquiry.
Distinction Between Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy. The courts have
not clearly distinguished between the concepts of conspiracy and aiding and
abetting and have frequently used the terms interchangeably. 50 Therefore,
it is appropriate to begin a discussion of secondary liability by determining
what is meant by these terms and examining some of the characteristics of
each theory of recovery.5 ' Perhaps the clearest definition of aiding and
abetting which has been applied in rule 10b-5 cases was derived from the
Restatement of Torts,5 2 which provides, in essence, that aiding and abetting
occurs when the defendant knows that the primary offender's conduct con-
stitutes a breach of duty and nevertheless gives substantial assistance or en-
couragement to the primary offender." In conspiracy, on the other hand,
the defendant is held liable if he agreed to participate in the act which
violates rule lOb-5. 54
47. The Civil Aeronautics Board ordered the Pan American Airlines and National
Airlines to either sell or re-exchange the stock because it was not deemed to be in the
public interest to allow control of companies to become mingled. Id. at 766.
48. 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
49. See Mann, supra note 37, at 1219-20.
50. See, e.g., SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D.
Tex.), af'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971); H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp.
95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
51. Both theories have their origins in criminal law. BROMBERG § 8.5(540), at
208.29.
52. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1933):
[P]ersons acting in concert for harm resulting to a third person from the
tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if he(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the conditions under
which the -act is done or intending the consequences which ensue, or(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tor-
tious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a
breach of duty to the third person.
53. This definition was cited with approval in the district court decision in the
landmark case of Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680
(N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970).
54. "The gist of conspiracy is the agreement; . . . [which goes] a step beyond
mere aiding, abetting .... ." Pinkerston v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 649 (1946).
1974]
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The distinction appears to be that aiding and abetting involves either an
act which expedites the primary wrong or gives encouragement to the pri-
mary offender which may sometimes take the form of failure to interfere.55
Thus, liability may be established for aiding and abetting even if no agree-
ment is proven.56 To juxtapose the three concepts-participation, conspira-
cy, and aiding and abetting-in terms of degrees of involvement, it would
seem that participation would entail direct participation in the wrongful act,
while aiding and abetting would involve indirect assistance in the primary
wrong and conspiracy would fall somewhere between the two.57 The ele-
ment of agreement in conspiracy suggests an overt act in actually making
the agreement and at least some degree of participation in accomplishing
a common goal. In contrast, aiding and abetting is ancillary to a primary
and independent wrong and may take the form of an act that is not in itself
a violation of rule lOb-5, or even simple inaction which encourages the pri-
mary violator.58
B. Elements of Aiding and Abetting Under Rule 10b-5
Independent Wrong. In order for liability to be imposed on the secondary
defendant there must exist an independent act which violates rule 1 Ob-5 to
which his act of assistance may attach. 59 However, courts have not empha-
sized the importance of establishing which acts are primary wrongs and
which are secondary.60  This distinction is also an important aspect of the
court's determination of whether the alleged aider and abettor had the req-
uisite knowledge of the wrongful act, because the court must identify the
act in question before it can determine whether the defendant had knowl-
edge of it.61
Generally, the primary wrong is easily isolated, although as the transac-
tions become more complex and the fraudulent schemes more resourceful,
this determination may become more difficult. In Sprayregen v. Livingston
Oil Co.62 a cause of action was stated against a director as an aider and
abettor because he gave his approval to a misleading speech by another
director. In this simple situation the primary culpable act is clearly the mis-
leading speech. Likewise, in Pettit v. American Stock Exchange65 the
American Stock Exchange was alleged to be an aider and abettor in a
scheme by the primary offender involving the fraudulent issuance of stock.
55. BROMBERG § 8.5(533), at 208.24.
56. Standards of Conduct 80.
57. Professor Bromberg has proposed a helpful conceptual analogy in terms of
business organization forms. "[Plarticipants are partners managing a single fraudulent
operation, aider-abettors are agents assisting the partners, and conspirators are partners
managing separate economically integrated operations." BROMBERG § 8.5(515), at
208.6.
58. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). In this landmark case the court found the defend-
ant secondarily liable as an aider and abettor for failure to take action to report a se-
curity dealer who was speculating with customer's funds in a fraudulent manner.
59. Ruder, supra note 2, at 628. This article contains an excellent discussion of
the elements of both conspiracy and aiding and abetting.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 630.
62. 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
63. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
[Vol. 28
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The particular fraudulent acts to which the aiding and abetting was asso-
ciated are easily discernible since they center around the issuance of one
company's stock. However, in Carpenter v. HallJ 6 4 the plaintiff named two
primary defendants and ninety-one secondary defendants consisting of per-
sons, partnerships, and corporations who allegedly aided and abetted or con-
spired with the primary defendants in a fraudulent scheme. In such a com-
plex situation where each secondary defendant only knew of part of the
whole fraudulent scheme, it is essential to identify the independent wrong
to which each secondary defendant's act of aiding and abetting is alleged
to be attached.
Knowledge. The plaintiff must not only show that there was an independ-
ent wrong but also that the defendant had knowledge of the wrong and,
nevertheless, gave assistance to the primary wrongdoer. 65 Generally, the
courts have required some degree of actual or constructive knowledge,
whether the case is against participants, aiders and abettors, or conspira-
tors.66  As previously noted, some courts 'have advocated the elimination of
knowledge of the fraudulent scheme as a prerequisite to imposition of liabil-
ity upon a primary participant.6 7 Although this result is consistent with the
accepted judicial philosophy that the rule should be flexibly construed in
order to accomplish its remedial purpose,6 s different considerations enter
into eliminating knowledge as an element of secondary liability and substi-
tuting a duty of inquiry or a "should have known" standard. 69  An aider
and abettor's or conspirator's acts often occur in the ordinary course of busi-
ness and may become objectionable only in their relation to the primary vio-
lation.70 'By eliminating the knowledge requirement the courts would be plac-
ing a severe burden on commerce because each individual would be forced
to investigate the activities of the party he is assisting in order to protect
himself against the imposition of liability for the fraudulent acts of others
of which he has no direct knowledge. 71
64. 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (S.D. Tex. 1970). "The complaint consists of 32
long legal pages, which sets out in great detail the alleged improper and unlawful con-
duct of the 93 Defendants describing the special acts of the particular Defendants on
named dates and in definite ways."
65. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
66. BROMBERG § 8.5(582), at 298.43.
67. When the scienter threshold is lowered the courts generally require more reli-
ance by the plaintiff upon the negligent misrepresentation. Comment, Negligent Mis-
representations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cal. L. REv. 824, 841-42 (1965). This reli-
ance depends on two factors-whether the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrep-
resentation, City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderbloom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970); Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
and the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. For example, if the defend-
ant was performing professional services for the plaintiff or was in a fiduciary relation-
ship with him, the plaintiff could reasonably place more reliance in his representations
and courts would seem more willing to hold the defendant liable for negligent misrep-
resentations in this special situation. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Drake v. Thor
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
68. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
69. Ruder, supra note 2, at 632.
70. BROMBERG § 8.5(582), at 208.43.
71. This would be an apparent reversion to the older philosophy espoused by Judge
Hand in Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). But see SEC v. Spectrum,
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If knowledge is a requisite to secondary liability under rule lOb-5, what
kind of knowledge will be sufficient to satisfy this requirement? The courts
seem to be in general agreement that liability will be found where -the person
who is allegedly secondarily liable has knowledge of the unlawful purpose
or conduct of the primary wrongdoer. 72 In Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co.,73 the first civil liability case construed under rule 10b-5, the court in-
dicated that liability would be imposed upon a conspirator when he knew
of ,the nondisclosure of the primary wrongdoer. Similarly, in Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. 74 the Seventh Circuit required prior
knowledge of the fraudulent activity in order for the defendant -to be held
liable as an aider and abettor. The courts have also utilized the same stand-
ard in construing Securities and Exchange Commission disciplinary pro-
ceedings involving the aiding and abetting of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions. 75
Another perplexing problem for the courts has been whether and to what
extent recklessness or carelessness in failing to become aware of the fraudu-
lent conduct can be used to establish constructive knowledge. In SEC v.
First Securities Co. 76 the Seventh Circuit stated that "liability predicated on
aiding and abetting may be founded on less than actual knowledge and par-
ticipation in the activity proscribed by section 10 and rule lOb-5." In that
case a securities firm was held liable as an aider and abettor to fraudulent
acts by its president because it failed to supervise his activities properly and
because the firm held him out to the public as a successful investment
counselor. Although there was no evidence that the securities firm had
direct knowledge, its acts were deemed by the court to be sufficiently reck-
less that knowledge should be imputed and liability established. Buttery v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.77 is another case in which
liability was found when no direct knowledge of the fraudulent scheme was
attributable to the aider and abettor. The court held a broker-dealer liable
as an aider and abettor to a customer's fraudulent activities because he
allowed the customer -to trade securities through a cash account in spite of
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), where the court in dicta rejected this general prem-
ise, and endorsed a negligence standard for imposition of liability upon aiders and abet-
tors in an injunction suit.
72. Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970); Fischman v. Ratheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876b(1939): "For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
a person is liable if he . . . knows 'that -the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so -to conduct himself."
73. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
74. 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
75. In Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1969), the court stated that "On
the basis of the [secondary defendant's] participation in the management of the firm
and his knowledge of the course of conduct in which his firm 'was engaging . . . the
Commission could have concluded that he 'aided and abetted' activities of the firm
which were found to be in violation of the federal securities law anti-fraud provisions."
It must be noted, however, that the SEC has express statutory authority to discipline
a broker-dealer or salesman for aiding and abetting the violation of SEC provisions.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(5)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(b)(5) (1970).
See BROMBERG § 8.5(539), at 208.27.
76. 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); accord, Pettit
v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
77. 410 F.2d 135, 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
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his awareness that the customer was financially unstable and engaged in er-
ratic trading practices.78
SEC v. National Bankers Life Insurance Co. 7 9 comes to some interesting
conclusions concerning constructive knowledge. The lawsuit arose out of a
complex stock fraud scheme involving thirteen corporations and fifteen in-
dividuals. Each person or corporation which was alleged to be secondarily
liable had only a limited knowledge of the overall fraudulent operation.
The court stated that "the defendant must have some general awareness that
his role is part of a complex activity and that the overall conduct is in some
way improper,"80 and added that the degree of knowledge required of an
aider and abettor should be greater when the scheme was more complex.
"The knowledge requirement for liability under such a [complex] scheme
is more than that required to hold someone as an aider and abettor to a
single sale of unregistered stock or a single fraudulent act. .... s'
This standard proposed in National Bankers Life-general awareness of
the overall improper conduct and that the act performed by the aider and
abettor contributes to the improper conduct 82-seems to substantially limit
the degree of constructive knowledge which can be attributed to the aider
and abettor in those situations sufficiently complex to warrant this approach.
The problem, of course, is in determining which schemes are complex
enough to apply this "general awareness test." It is also arguable that the
knowledge required under this new test is very close to actual knowledge,
since, in order to have an awareness of the overall fraudulent scheme plus
an understanding of how the act fits into that scheme, the aider and abettor
would have to have some cognizance of the entire fraudulent scheme of the
primary wrongdoer. A more flexible interpretation of the knowledge re-
quirement would be more in keeping with the remedial purposes of rule lOb-
5.83
It has been held that knowledge can be established by circumstantial evi-
dence84 or by inference. 5 Also, a complaint which alleged that the defend-
ant aider and abettor knew or should have known of the primary offense
has been held to be valid.8 " However, the cases give no clear indication
of how much or what kind of evidence will be sufficient to establish actual
or constructive knowledge.87
To summarize, the courts have required some degree of actual or con-
structive knowledge by the aider and abettor of the improper conduct of
the primary offender.88 However, a standard which requires no knowledge
78. Id. at 136-37.
79. 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th'lCir. 1971).
80. 324 F. Supp. at 195 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Judge Sarah T. Hughes is not alone in requiring that knowledge extend further
in a complex transaction. See Wyndham Associates v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968).
83. See cases cited note 68 supra.
84. SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
85. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
86. Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
87. BROMBERG § 8.5(583), at 208.45.
88. Ruder, supra note 2, at 638.
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whatsoever of the violative conduct by the aider and abettor, but rather im-
poses an affirmative duty upon the secondary offender to insure that -the
primary participant has not misstated or omitted to state material facts
relevant -to the securities transaction,8 9 seems inherently unfair. In the ab-
sence of circumstances which would put him on notice of a possible viola-
tion, such a standard would place an onerous burden upon a person who
has not directly participated in the violative conduct. Accordingly, it is un-
reasonable to place upon an outside director the duty to supervise securities
transactions which are negotiated by the management personnel of the cor-
poration upon whose board he serves.90
The Nature of the Act: Affirmative Conduct. The courts have had no
trouble in imposing secondary liability on those who knowingly perform acts
which substantially contribute to the fraudulent scheme of the primary
wrongdoer. For example, one of the more common situations in which liabil-
ity is found for aiding and abetting is in the preparation of financial state-
ments containing fraudulent misrepresentations.9 1 However, courts have indi-
cated that even more passive conduct such as providing the primary parti-
cipant with office space, telephone facilities, and the benefit of the aider
and abettor's good business reputation could give rise to secondary liability.92
In Blakely v. Lisac93 the court followed the same rationale in holding a fi-
nancial advisor liable as an aider and abettor when he allowed his name
and reputation to be used to lend credibility to a fraudulent prospectus. Simi-
larly, in a recent Seventh Circuit case, SEC v. First Securities Co.,94 the
court found a securities firm liable as an aider and abettor when it indirectly
contributed to the fraudulent conduct of its president by holding him out
to the public as a successful and reliable investment counselor. Another Sev-
enth Circuit case held a brokerage firm liable as an aider and abettor for
the fraudulent acts of a customer, when it allowed the customer to trade
through a cash account even -though it knew he traded recklessly and was
financially unstable. 95 The concept of aiding and abetting by affirmative
conduct96 was further extended when a court upheld a complaint against the
89. Judge Hays, dissenting in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1317 (2d
Cir. 1973), seems to favor the imposition of secondary liability under rule lOb-5 upon
aiders and abettors (specifically outside directors) even in the absence of circumstances
which would put them on notice of a violation by the primary participant.
90. In the majority opinion of Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir.
1973), Judge Moore rejected the invitation to impose liability upon an outside director
for failure to supervise a securities transaction of the corporation by investigating the
negotiations between the corporation and the prospective purchaser to make sure that
material adverse information had been conveyed by corporate management.
91. See, e.g., Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf.
H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
92. Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968). Al-
though the court discusses the acts of the alleged aider and abettor which assisted the
primary wrongdoer, there is language in the opinion which suggests that such indirect
assistance might be viewed by the court as aiding and abetting by inaction. Id. at 709.
93. 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972).
94. 463 F.2d 981, 986-87 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
95. Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
96. In pleading an aiding and abetting claim it is usually more advantageous -for
the plaintiff to plead affirmative conduct if there is any hope for success, because an
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American Stock Exchange, alleging that it had aided and abetted a broker
in fraudulent transactions because it failed to take disciplinary action against
the broker. 97 Although the court did not discuss the possibility that the ex-
change could be liable for aiding and abetting by inaction, the facts are more
susceptible to an inaction theory. 98
Silence or Inaction. Perhaps the greatest potential risk which the outside
director faces in the aiding and abetting field is that of being sued for aid-
ing and abetting by inaction.99 This inaction theory had its birth in the
district court decision in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance
Co., 100 where the court considered a scheme by a securities dealer to delay
the delivery of stock certificates to customers, and thereby create a period
in which he could fraudulently speculate with their money. Liability was
imposed on Midwestern because, although it knew of the fraudulent scheme,
it failed to refer complaining customers directly to the Indiana Securities
Commission, but rather referred them first to the securities dealer. Mid-
western indirectly benefited from aiding the dealer, for by purchasing Mid-
western shares he pushed the stock price up, making it possible for Mid-
western to acquire other companies by exchanging their shares for the other
companies, based on the market price of the securities. The court con-
cluded that Midwestern's acquiescence through silence in the fraudulent con-
duct of the dealer constituted aiding and abetting. 1 1
The Ninth Circuit has come to a contrary result in Wessel v. Buhler,102
a case involving an accountant who allegedly failed to disclose his knowledge
of fraudulent financial records to prospective investors. The court refused
the invitation to find liability solely for inaction and interpreted rule 10b-
5 to impose liability for an omission of fact only when it is necessary to
clarify an affirmative statement which has been made.' 0 ' Perhaps the dis-
tinction between Brennan and Wessel lies in the fact that in Brennan the
alleged aider and abettor had benefited from remaining silent while in
Wessel the accountant had received no extra benefits by virtue of his sil-
ence.'
0 4
allegation of silence or inaction is much more vulnerable to dismissal as a less-tested
theory of recovery. BROMBERG § 8.5(596), at 208.55.
97. Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
98. The court characterizes the stock exchange as a conduit through which the
fraudulent transactions were consummated and to this extent there seemed to be some
basis for the affirmative conduct approach taken by the court. Id. at 24.
99. See Standards of Conduct 81.
100. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
101. The district court's decision is arguably not as conclusive a determination due
to the language of the Seventh Circuit in reviewing the case, indicating that Midwestern
had also been guilty of affirmative acts which would constitute aiding and abetting.
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
102. 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
103. Id. at 283.
104. Professor Bromberg has argued that liability should not be imposed on the
aider and abettor solely for inaction in the absence of some benefit derived from the
silence. In both participation and conspiracy some overt act is necessary for the im-
position of liability. Thus, it would seem unjust to impose liability in aiding and abet-
ting contexts for complete nonfeasance. BROMBERO § 8.5(533), at 208.25.
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The outside director is particularly vulnerable under the inaction theory.
A suit could be posited upon the following theory:
(1) the corporation was engaged in activities which were illegal
under the securities acts; (2) although the officer or director did
not participate in the activities, he knew that the activities were
taking place; and (3) his failure to prevent the activities from
taking place should expose him to liability under the securities
laws. 105
In Blakely v. Lisac'0 6 many of these considerations entered into the court's
decision that two outside directors would be held responsible for misrepre-
sentations made in an annual report. 10 7 Here, the outside directors not only
did not participate in the preparation of the annual report but also received
no profit and loss statement indicating the exact amount of the loss. Never-
theless, they were held responsible for a general knowledge that the com-
pany was operating at a loss, and that the loss was not accurately reflected
in the annual report. This decision indicates that a director has a duty to
stop illegal activities known to him and must disclose material adverse in-
formation to prospective investors. It is interesting to note that the court
also found the lawyer who helped prepare misleading corporate statements
liable both in his professional capacity and in his capacity as director. 08
This dual liability is of particular significance to the outside director who
often performs professional services for the company as well as fulfilling the
responsibilities of his directorship. As a practical matter, outside directors
or professional persons who perform services for the corporation are seldom
sued unless the corporation is bankrupt and the inside directors are either
insolvent or cannot be located. In this situation only the outside director
stands between the investor and total loss.
III. THE POTENTIAL SECONDARY LIABILITY OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS
A. Lanza v. Drexel & Co.
The Second Circuit, in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,109 considered both the
director's duty to convey adverse information to prospective purchasers of
corporate stock and -the secondary liability of outside directors as aiders and
abettors in fraudulent statements made by management to prospective pur-
chasers. In rejecting the negligence standard, the court concluded that a
director who is not a participant in the transaction owes no duty to insure
that all material adverse information is conveyed to prospective purchasers
of the stock of the corporation on whose board he sits. 10 The court rea-
soned that "[a]bsent knowledge or substantial participation we have refused
105. Standards of Conduct 81.
106. 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972).
107. Id. at 264.
108. Id. at 266. See also SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
109. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
110. Id. at 1289. The court also examined the legislative history relevant to the
passage of the 1934 Act, and more particularly § 10(b), and concluded that "[t]o im-
pose a duty to convey upon directors under Rule lob-5 would be to ignore ...Con-
gressional intent." Id. at 1299.
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to impose such affirmative duties of disclosure upon rule 1Ob-5 defend-
ants.""' The court determined that the facts of the case did not lend them-
selves to a finding that Coleman, an outside director and investment advisor
for the BarChris Corporation, was secondarily liable as an aider and abettor.
This case arose out of the events which led to the bankruptcy of Bar-
Chris Construction Company. 112 The plaintiffs, who were the sole owners
of Victor Billiard Company, exchanged 20,000 shares of Victor stock for
20,428 shares of BarChris Construction Company stock. Less than one
year later BarChris filed a petition in bankruptcy, and, after an unsuccessful
attempt to recover their shares in a rescission action, the plaintiffs brought
a civil action against the officers and directors of BarChris. The trial
court 1 found several of the corporate officers and management directors
liable under rule 10b-5 as participants in the fraudulent scheme, but refused
to impose liability upon Coleman as an aider and abettor because he had
no knowledge of the fraudulent information conveyed by the treasurer of
BarChris to plaintiffs in -the negotiations leading to the stock exchange trans-
action. In affirming the trial court the Second Circuit discussed several
cases which have particular relevance to the situation of the outside direc-
tor. In Mader v. Armel" 4 plaintiff-shareholders of one corporation sued
the officers and directors of another, alleging -that the latter had fraudulently
induced the plaintiffs to exchange their stock. Apparently, the president of
the latter corporation was the primary party involved in the fraud which
was perpetrated upon -the plaintiffs. Defendants Tibbals and Young were
directors who neither knew of nor participated in the fraudulent transac-
tion. The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the dismissal of the complaint against
the non-participant directors, found that they had placed implicit confidence
in the integrity of the president and had also relied upon erroneous finan-
cial data which had been computed by a certified public accountant. Thus,
they did nothing directly or indirectly to induce the fraudulent transaction." 5
Another case which is illustrative of the position of an outside director under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is Moerman v. Zipco, Inc.," 6 in which the
trial court held Nasser, the president and director of Zipco, liable for fraud-
ulently inducing plaintiffs to buy Zipco stock. However, the court held that
certain outside directors had no significant contact with the plaintiff, and,
therefore, were not liable under section 10(b) or rule 1Ob-5. This decision
indicates that a director's obligation to potential purchasers of the corpora-
tion's stock is merely secondary unless he actually participated in the fraud-
111. Id. at 1302.
112. In Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a
leading case decided under Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), the
court held officers and directors of BarChris who signed a bond registration statement
containing material misstatements, liable to those who bought the securities in the orig-
inal offering. However, since the transaction involved in this litigation was a private
offering rather than a public offering, it has been argued that the duties imposed upon
directors should be less stringent since the public interest in private offerings is less
pronounced.
113. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
114. 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
115. Id. at 1125.
116. 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970).
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ulent transaction. Therefore, it would seem to be equally applicable to in-
side directors or corporate officers who took part in the overall management
of the corporation but did not participate in -the particular fraudulent trans-
action. Such an extension of this premise would lead to an unjust result
because it would exonerate those who have a duty to supervise corporate
affairs.117
It has been persuasively argued that the reluctance of courts to impose
liability upon the unknowing outside -director under rule 10b-5 is based upon
the realization that there must be a division of labor among corporate per-
sonnel and that the -functions and responsibilities of an outside director nec-
essarily differ markedly from those of corporate officers and management
directors. 118 Moreover, a corporate director is entitled to rely upon advice
of corporate counsel or corporate financial statements." 9 Likewise, direc-
,tors have not been held liable for actions taken in good faith reliance upon
representations made by other corporate officers.' 20  Thus, the majority in
Lanza adhered to the philosophy which Judge Learned Hand expressed in
Barnes v. Andrews,121 that a corporate director should not be required under
threat of liability to investigate and supervise every aspect of the corpora-
tion's business. Rather, he may properly rely on the integrity and compe-
tence of corporate officers and fellow directors whom he in good faith
trusts.
1 2 2
Judge Timbers, dissenting in Lanza, did not challenge the majority's con-
clusion that Coleman had no actual knowledge of the specific fraudulent
transactions. Instead the opinion was based on the conclusion that construc-
tive knowledge of the fraudulent conduct could be attributed to Coleman
and, therefore, liability should be imposed upon him.' 28  The facts demon-
strated that he had a general awareness that there was an accelerating de-
cline in the conditions of the business, and a propensity on the part of man-
agement to gloss over that fact.' 24 Since Coleman had been on the board,
BarChris had suffered several major business setbacks, and the working
capital was constantly depleted by large cash expenditures necessary for its
operation. This adversity was brought directly to Coleman's attention at a
"point of crisis"' 25 board meeting which occurred eight days before the trans-
117. Judge Hays dissenting in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1311-20 (2d
Cir. 1973), would extend this duty to supervise to outside directors.
118. Brief for Appellee at 35, Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.
1973).
119. The New York corporation law expressly provides for good faith reliance by
corporate directors upon "financial statements of the corporation represented to them
to be correct by the president or the officer of -the corporation having charge of its
books of accounts, or stated in a written report by an independent public or certified
public accountant or firm of such accountants fairly to reflect the financial condition
of such corporation." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1963). For other
representative acts which provide the same protection to corporate directors, see ABA-
ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT 2d § 48(c), 1 (West 1971); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAw§ 141(e) (Supp. 1972); TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.41 (1973).
120. Brief for Appellee at 35.
121. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
122. Ukropina, Lanza v. Drexel & Co.: Some Comfort for the Outside Director,
but More Needed, 48 L.A. BAR BULL. 330, 355 (1973).
123. 479 F.2d at 1320-2.2.
124. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 10.
125. 479 F.2d at 1321.
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action with the plaintiff was finalized. Additionally, Coleman was aware
that the management had made misleading statements with respect to securi-
ties transactions in the past. In view of Coleman's knowledge and experi-
ence in financial matters, Judge Timbers felt that the circumstances imposed
upon him the duty to inquire into the potentially fraudulent transaction. 126
Judge Hays, in his dissent, indicated that even if Coleman could not be
charged with constructive knowledge, liability should nevertheless be im-
posed upon him because he did nothing to inform -himself of the character
of the negotiations. 127 The securities laws have made no distinction between
inside and outside directors,'128 but rather impose upon a director of a cor-
poration the obligation not to defraud the other party in a securities trans-
action by misstating or omitting to state material facts. 129  It was also
pointed out that such !an interpretation of liability requirements with respect
to non-participant, outside directors would be in concert with the legislative
purpose and uniform application of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 30
B. SEC v. Spectrum Ltd.
The due diligence standard for aiders and abettors which was set out by
Judge Hays dissenting in Lanza was employed by the Second Circuit in SEC
v. Spectrum Ltd.,13l which involved violations of the registration 3 2 and anti-
fraud. 3 provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the antifraud provi-
sions' 34 of the 1934 Act. The SEC alleged that an attorney had prepared
an opinion letter on the basis of which the primary violator had sold un-
registered securities. However, the trial court refused to enjoin the attor-
ney from further violations because negligent conduct does not in itself con-
stitute a violation of the securities law. On appeal, the court reversed and
remanded the case to the trial court because highly material findings of fact
concerning the attorney's knowledge of the primary violation at the time that
he prepared the opinion letter had not been made.
In commenting on the appropriate rule of law to be applied by the trial
court in resolving the case, the court stated that "imposition of a negligence
standard with respect to the conduct of a secondary participant is [not]
overly strict at least in the context of -this case. The legal profession plays
a unique and pivotal role in the effective implementation of the securities
laws."'1 5  The court rejected Professor Ruder's thesis that the aider and
abettor whose acts occur in the course of ordinary business and are not in
themselves violations should not be required to investigate -the ultimate
activities of the party he is assisting. 1-3  In view of the circumstances of
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1319.
128. Id. at 1317.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1319.
131. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970).
133. Id. § 77q(a).
134. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10b-5, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
135. 489 F.2d at 541-42.
136. Ruder, supra note 2, at 632-633.
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this case the court felt that "[t]he preparation of an opinion letter is too
essential and the reliance of the public too high to permit due diligence -to
be cast aside in the name of convenience. '"187
Spectrum may be distinguished from Lanza in that it was an injunction
suit rather than a private action for damages and the court has repeatedly
adhered to a more flexible knowledge requirement where equitable or pro-
phylactic relief is sought.'88 This dichotomy was emphasized by the court
in Spectrum when it expressly stated that the standard of conduct applied
in a suit for injunctive relief should not be construed to apply to private
suits for damages." 39  In addition, Spectrum may be distinguished from
Lanza because it involved aiding and abetting by affirmative conduct rather
than by a failure to act. The courts have been much more reluctant to
impose liability for nonfeasance of an aider and abettor in the absence of
some degree of knowledge of the improper conduct, 40  It is also apparent
that both the outside director in Lanza and the lawyer in Spectrum had
specialized knowledge which should have made them more acutely aware
of the particular fraudulent activity. However, the objectionable conduct
of the lawyer was performed in his professional capacity, and under circum-
stances which would seem to create a fiduciary relationship between him
and the parties to the transaction. In similar fact situations the courts have
consistently applied closer scrutiny to the conduct of the secondary partic-
ipant.' 4 ' The impact of the Spectrum decision upon the potential liability
of outside directors in private actions for damages seems to be diminished
in view of the distinguishing factors heretofore discussed.
C. Standards Applied by the Courts and the SEC
The theories of secondary liability which are applicable to the outside
director fall roughly into three categories. (1) If the outside director has
actual knowledge of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by management, all
courts seem to agree that he should be secondarily liable.' 42  (2) Some
courts and commentators contend that the outside director may be secon-
darily liable when he has constructive knowledge of the primary wrong.' 41
This is simply another way of saying that a duty arises under rule lOb-5
when circumstances exist which would put a reasonable director on notice
that there is a potentiality that corporate officers or management have en-
gaged in improper conduct associated with a securities transaction. (3) A
third view has been proposed which would impose an affirmative duty upon
137. 489 F.2d at 542.
138. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir.
1972); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Gen-
esco Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967).
139. 489 F.2d at 541.
140. BROMBERG § 8.5(533), at 208.25.
141. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967); Trussell
v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
142. See notes 72-75 supra, and accompanying text.
143. In Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973), although the
majority had no knowledge of the fraudulent nondisclosure, the court seems to accept
the constructive knowledge standard as a basis for liability under rule lOb-5. See also
Ruder, supra note 2, at 638.
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the outside director to investigate and supervise securities transactions of the
corporation, regardless of whether circumstances exist which would put him
on notice of a possible violation of rule 1Ob-5 by management.144
By way of amicus curiae brief in Lanza the SEC indicated its awareness
of the special situation of the outside director who is not normally involved
in the day-to-day conduct of corporate affairs. 145  The Commission ex-
pressed agreement with a standard of conduct which would require some
actual or constructive knowledge by the outside director of the improper
conduct by management. In the absence of circumstances which would put
him on notice of a violation, the Commission would refuse to impose upon
an outside director a duty to supervise the conduct of management in securi-
ties transactions engaged in by the corporation. 146
The courts and the SEC should carefully construe the facts of each case
before imposing liability upon outside directors by simply adhering to a pre-
fabricated standard of conduct. There is no simple formula which will lead
to a judicious result in every case because many variables exist which may
affect the culpability of the particular defendant.' 47  Corporate affairs are
too complex to impose a duty to supervise upon directors who participate
only in an advisory capacity, unless the circumstances of the particular case
as well as the knowledge and experience of the defendant would create such
a duty.
IV. METHODS OF INDEMNIFICATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
Increasingly, the major business decisions of American corporations in-
volve social and political overtones which can only be assessed by a board
made up of persons with varied background and experience.' 48  The outside
director may lend an independent perspective to the corporate decision mak-
ing process by being able to analyze corporate problems from a viewpoint
144. This approach is implicit in the language of Judge Hays' dissent in Lanza v.
Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277, 1317-18 (2d Cir. 1973).
145. See Summary of April 6, 1973, address by former SEC Chairman G. Bradford
Cook entitled, The Director's Dilemma, BNA SEC. REG. G.L. REP. April 11, 1973, at
A-7. In this statement Cook revealed that the preparation of an SEC position paper
on the liability of outside directors was currently in progress. The full text of former
Chairman Cook's statement is set out in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 79,302.
146. It is the Commission's view that in the context of a securities transac-
tion a director who approves, but does not otherwise participate in the
transaction would not be liable to a third party unless he knew, or had
reasonable cause to believe, that the responsible corporate officers had
engaged in improper conduct in connection with the transaction. Absent
circumstances which would put him on notice of a material failure in
disclosure by .the corporation, a director, acting with due care and rely-
ing in good faith on officers whom he has no reason to believe are act-
ing improperly, would not incur liability under Rule lob-5 . . .merely
by reason of his having authorized or approved the transaction.
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5, Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.
1973).
147. For an excellent discussion of the various considerations which make the im-
position of liability in each case vary according to the particular attributes of the par-
ties involved, see Mann, note 37 supra.
148. Estes, Outside Directors More Vulnerable Than Ever, 51 HARv. Bus. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 107, 114.
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not clouded by constant association with the particular industry.149  Also,
the outside director may be of great value to the stockholders in supervis-
ing and advising the management, due to his individual professional com-
petence and judgment. 150 However, at present there are too few competent
individuals who are willing to accept directorships because of potential lia-
bility which may inure to the unsuspecting outside director. 15' Since rule
10b-5 applies to fraudulent conduct which occurs in relation to buy-and-sell
transactions in general, liability may be extended to losses occurring in open
market transactions. Thus, if the issuer corporation has one or more widely
traded securities outstanding, the potential damages could be of vast propor-
tions.152
Courts adhere to a policy of joint and several liability with respect to other
securities provisions and, in view of the prevalence of joint and several lia-
bility in general tort theory, there is little reason to doubt that rule 10b-
5 liability will develop in the same way.' 5' In Pettit v. American Stock
Exchange' 54 the court indicated that aiders and abettors would be subjected
to liability equal to that of the primary wrongdoers. The Ninth Circuit has
refused to apportion liability and has held that those who are only secon-
darily liable are responsible for the entire amount of damages to the plain-
tiff.15 5 Strict application of joint and several liability to all associated with
a violation of rule 1Ob-5 would be particularly oppressive to the outside
director who, by virtue of his position, may be subjected to claims by mul-
tiple plaintiffs for cumulative damages. A more equitable approach would
be to apportion damages among the various defendants in proportion to their
degree of involvement in and knowledge of the fraudulent transaction.'5 6
Indemnification and insurance have been two tools which corporations
have employed to reduce the risk that their officers or directors will be sub-
jected to a great financial burden because of corporate affairs. Forty-seven
149. Id.
150. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1092-93 (1968).
151. Although liability will probably not be -imposed under rule lOb-5 unless the di-
rector has some actual or constructive knowledge of a primary wrong, he may incur
absolute liability under Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), if he
signs a registration statement which contains material misstatements. Escott v. Bar-
Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
152. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Is-
sues Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776, 825-26 (1972).
153. BROMBERG § 8.5(585), at 208.50.
154. 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910(1973).
155. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 456 (9th Cir. 1956); accord, Sprayregen v.
Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
156. Professor Bromberg has argued that:
Given the possible complexities of securities violations, their intricate
ramifications, and the suability under lOb-5 of relatively remote and in-
significant parties, there will be occasions when it is just and reasonable
to apportion liability of lesser wrongdoers. A rigid rule of entire liabil-
ity would also be out of keeping with the flexibility of remedies for
which lOb-5 has become notable.
BROMBERG § 8.5(585), at 208.52.
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states now have statutes which provide for the indemnification of officers
and directors and several states have enacted statutes providing that corpora-
tions may purchase and maintain liability insurance for their officers, direc-
tors, and employees. 157 The indemnification statutes usually provide for a
mandatory indemnity for legal expenses incurred by a director or officer in
a successful legal defense,158 and some provide for permissive indemnity
when, in the view of the board, the individual officer or director was acting
in good faith. 159 However, permissive indemnification may be of limited ben-
efit in rule lOb-5 violations because public policy would militate against in-
demnifying an officer or director for willful misconduct. 16 0
Liability insurance for corporate officers and directors has been a popu-
lar means of avoiding direct and vicarious financial burdens. Although
these policies have various exclusions, one primary objective is to protect
an innocent director when he is subject -to secondary liability for the wrong-
doing of a fellow director or corporate officer.' 6 ' In addition, outside direc-
tors may obtain insurance which will protect them from liability associated
with a specific securities issue or transaction. 16 2 Also, at least one com-
pany163 has tailored an insurance policy specifically for the person who
serves as an outside director on one or more boards.' 6 4 This type of policy
appears to cover negligent acts or omissions, but the language of this and
other director liability policies is not conducive to an interpretation that they
would cover willful misconduct. Finally, it must be emphasized that since
many outside directors also perform professional services for the corporation,
additional liability insurance may be necessary to guard against potential
liability for action taken by the individual in his professional capacity.
V. CONCLUSION
The dissolution of privity as a necessary element for suit under rule lOb-
5 has opened the door for many plaintiffs to recover for the same fraudulent
act. However, in order for liability to be imposed upon the outside or non-
participant director, the courts have almost unanimously required some in-
volvement in or knowledge of the primary wrong. 165
A director's involvement in the fraudulent act may take the form of ac-
tive participation, conspiracy, or aiding and abetting. Generally, participa-
tion signals the most direct involvement and often entails actual participation
in the buy-sell transaction by a misrepresentation or non-disclosure. Con-
spiracy involves an agreement between the primary wrongdoer and the con-
spirator and usually entails some participation by the conspirator in perpe-
157. Knepper, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Corporation
Officers and Directors, 25 Sw. L.J. 240 (1971).
158. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(16) (Supp. 1974).
159. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(f) (West Supp. 1974).
160. The Texas statute specifically prohibits indemnification to be given to one who
is held liable for negligence or misconduct in performance of his duty. Thx. Bus.
CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(16) (Supp. 1974).
161. Cf. Knepper, supra note 157, at 256.
162. Id. at 259.
163. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. Form 16254 DLP-Rev. 1-67.
164. See Knepper, supra note 157, at 260.
165. BROMBERG § 8.5(582), at 208.43.
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trating the fraud. Aiding and abetting usually involves an act which in itself
is not a violation of rule 1Ob-5 but which serves to expedite -the primary
wrong. According to the generally accepted definition of aiding and
abetting 166 some knowledge of the fraudulent act is required. This knowl-
edge, however, may involve actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the
facts. Since aiding and abetting signals the most remote involvement, cor-
respondingly more knowledge of the fraudulent act is required before liabil-
ity will be imposed on the aider and abettor. However, in SEC v. Spectrum
Ltd.1 7 the court indicated that mere negligent conduct by the aider and
abettor would be sufficient for the court to give equitable relief. A few
courts' have determined that silence or inaction is sufficient for aiding and
abetting liability, but the majority of courts and commentators still seem to
require some act by the aider and abettor which directly or indirectly con-
tributes to the fraudulent conduct of the primary wrongdoer.
Lanza v. Drexel & Co.' 69 is good news to the outside director who fears
the imposition of liability upon himself because of the fraudulent acts of
fellow directors or management of the corporation. The majority opinion
seems to return to the standard set forth by Judge Learned Hand in Barnes
v. Andrews,' 70 in allowing the outside director to rely upon the competence
and integrity of other directors and management personnel and, unless given
reason to suspect them, to assume they will not engage in fraudulent con-
duct. More importantly, the Securities and Exchange Commission, by way
of amicus curiae brief, indicated its -approval of this standard of conduct
for outside directors, even though it disagreed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the facts relating to the existence of constructive knowledge in this
particular case. Judge Hays' dissent suggests that liability should be im-
posed on an outside director who fails to properly investigate securities trans-
actions conducted by the management to insure that material nondisclosures
or misstatements have not been made. However, this duty to supervise is
more akin to the director's management responsibilities and it seems unjust to
impose such a duty upon outside directors who act only in an advisory
capacity and do not participate in the day-to-day affairs of the corporation.
To encourage competent individuals to accept directorships, corporations
have resorted to indemnification and liability insurance designed to protect
the director from vicarious liability. Certainly these protective measures ac-
complish two favorable objectives-to protect the outside director from per-
sonal liability and to continue to make funds available to compensate those
who are harmed in fraudulent securities transactions. Rule lOb-5 should
not be extended by the courts to impose liability for failure to supervise cor-
porate affairs upon outside directors when they possess no actual or con-
structive knowledge of the primary violation. Such an extension of liability
166. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
167. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
168. See, e.g., Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972); Brennan v. Mid-
western United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aft'd, 417 F.2d 147
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
169. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
170. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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would defeat one of the primary purposes of the rule, which is to protect
investors from fraudulent business practices. Surely, the independent judg-
ment and experience of most outside directors does much to protect investors
against the fraudulent conduct of corporations and, by discouraging compe-
tent individuals from being directors, rule 1Ob-5 would be allowed to impede
the objective which it is designed to attain.
